SeaweedFS: Path traversal in the S3 and Iceberg REST gateways allows cross-bucket access
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 2%. No fixed version is recorded.
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for object storage (S3), file systems, and Iceberg tables. Prior to 4.30, the S3 API gateway and the Iceberg REST catalog gateway construct their routers with mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true). With path cleaning disabled, a .. segment inside the URL survives routing, so a request such as `GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/key`, is matched as bucket=bucket-A, object=../evil-bucket/key. The captured object key is then joined into a filer path with util.JoinPath (S3) / path.Join (Iceberg), which collapse the .. server-side, so the actual read or write lands in evil-bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.30.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| seaweedfs | <4.30 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
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