Vikunja: Cross-tenant IDOR in kanban move-task endpoint via unauthorized body task_id
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks accepts a body supplied task_id but TaskBucket.CanUpdate in pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go authorizes only the project, view, and bucket from the URL. updateTaskBucket then calls Task.ReadOne without a separate task permission check, returns the victim task contents, and can update the task done state when the attacker chooses a done bucket. Because task identifiers are global sequential values, an authenticated user can enumerate cross-tenant tasks and modify their completion metadata through both the v1 and v2 routes that share this model. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| go-vikunja | <2.4.0 |
Timeline
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