Etherpad: x-proxy-path header reflected into admin HTML/JS/CSS (cache-poisoning XSS) and concatenated into redirect (open-redirect)
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
Etherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. From 2.1.0 until 3.1.0, Etherpad uses the attacker-controlled x-proxy-path request header in src/node/hooks/express/admin.ts when substituting paths into HTML, JavaScript, and CSS under /admin without sanitization, Vary: x-proxy-path, or Cache-Control: private, no-store. A shared proxy or CDN can cache the resulting response and serve attacker-injected script to an administrator. In src/node/hooks/express/specialpages.ts, version 3.0.0 also accepts a protocol-relative x-proxy-path value when constructing the /p/:pad/timeslider redirect, allowing redirection to an attacker-controlled host. The issues are exploitable when the deployment permits client-supplied x-proxy-path headers to reach Etherpad. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ether | >=2.1.0 <3.1.0 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
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