LangChain MongoDB: NoSQL Operator Injection in MongoDBSaver.list() leading to cross-tenant data exposure
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
LangChain MongoDB provides integrations between MongoDB, Atlas, LangChain, and LangGraph. Prior to langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0, MongoDBSaver.list(), MongoDBSaver.alist(), and MongoDBStore.search() incorporate filter dictionaries into MongoDB queries without recursively rejecting keys prefixed with $. An authenticated caller who controls a filter argument through HTTP query parameters, request body fields, or agent tool arguments can inject MongoDB Query Language operators such as $regex or $where. In a multi-tenant deployment that uses the filter to enforce per-user or per-tenant isolation, injected operators can bypass intended equality filtering and expose other tenants' checkpoint or store data. Filters constructed entirely from trusted server-side values have lower practical risk. This issue is fixed in langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| langchain-ai | <0.4.0, <0.3.0 |
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