Private action arguments can be set by user input in Ash
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 3.29.3 and d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea.
Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=3.0.0 <3.29.3, >=5967ed3a483ab949866e6d7b043b043e61703f17 <d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea | 3.29.3, d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea |
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