Tract: Arbitrary file read via unsanitized ONNX external_data `location` (path traversal) on model load in tract-onnx
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2, the tract-onnx crate passes the attacker-controlled external_data location from an ONNX model through onnx/src/tensor.rs get_external_resources and joins the value to the model directory without rejecting absolute paths or parent directory components. Loading an untrusted model through model_for_path can therefore make onnx/src/data_resolver.rs MmapDataResolver open an arbitrary local file and place the file contents into model tensors or inference output. Attacker-controlled offset and length fields can also select an out-of-range mapping slice and cause a denial of service, but the flaw does not write files or execute code. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sonos | <0.21.17, >=0.22.0 <0.22.3, >=0.23.0 <0.23.2 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket