Allure: Path Traversal in Allure Report HTTP Server Allows Arbitrary File Read
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| allure-framework | <2.39.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket