Trestle SSTI in Jinja2 include tags allows arbitrary code execution (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46439)
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions prior to 3.12.4 and 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the custom Jinja2 include tags mdsection_include and md_clean_include re-parse the content of an included Markdown file as Jinja2 template code in a non-sandboxed environment, allowing server-side template injection that can lead to arbitrary code execution. The MDSectionInclude and MDCleanInclude tags in Trestle/core/jinja/tags.py pass included file content to Parser(self.environment, ...).parse(), splicing it into the host template's compilation, and the environment is a plain jinja2.Environment rather than a SandboxedEnvironment, so any expressions in the file are evaluated with full access to the usual SSTI gadget chain. Because Trestle's Markdown writers emit OSCAL prose and component-description fields verbatim, applying delimiter neutralization only to parameter tables, attacker-controlled OSCAL data such as a control statement, part prose, or component description containing Jinja2 syntax flows into an included Markdown file and is executed when the include tag re-parses it. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| oscal-compass | <3.12.4, >=4.0.0 <4.1.0 |
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