vLLM: Unauthenticated audio decompression-bomb DoS in /v1/chat/completions
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.24.0, the input_audio handling path for /v1/chat/completions calls AudioMediaIO.load_bytes or AudioMediaIO.load_file without passing VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S to the shared audio decoder. An unauthenticated client can therefore submit a small compressed audio input that expands into a very large float32 PCM allocation, bypassing the duration guard already used by /v1/audio/transcriptions and causing an out-of-memory worker crash. Inline data URLs reach this path without being bounded by VLLM_AUDIO_FETCH_TIMEOUT. The issue affects deployments serving an audio-capable model, and authentication changes only the deployment-specific reachability. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm-project | <0.24.0 |
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