mcp-searxng: DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web_url_read`
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read receives its caller-controlled URL through src/index.ts and validates only the literal hostname in assertUrlAllowed() within src/url-reader.ts before undiciFetch() performs operating-system DNS resolution. A public-looking attacker-controlled hostname that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore passes the lexical check and causes the MCP server to connect to the internal destination. In the default HTTP configuration, an unauthenticated network client can use this path to read internal services, expose credentials or service tokens, and enumerate reachable internal hosts; in STDIO deployments, prompt-influenced tool selection can provide the malicious URL. Direct private IP literals are blocked, and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS remains an explicit opt-out. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ihor-sokoliuk | <1.7.1 |
Timeline
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