Zalktis: SQL injection via partner-controlled fields in imported e-invoices
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 2026.1.586 and 2026.2.592.
SQL injection in the Zalktis accounting application via trading-partner-controlled text fields in received electronic invoices. When importing a received e-invoice (UBL/PEPPOL) or an e-commerce export, Zalktis concatenates partner-controlled values directly into SQL statement text using string concatenation, with neither parameterised queries nor escaping. The application's own escaping helper, Dazadi.sql_txt(), is not invoked on these code paths, so a party that sends an invoice can break out of the string literal and alter the query logic. This issue affects Zalktis: before 2026.1.586 and before 2026.2.592.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zalktis Programmas (SIA "Zalktis Programmas") | <2026.1.586, <2026.2.592 | 2026.1.586, 2026.2.592 |
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