LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback
Exploited in the wild, in CISA KEV since 2 Sep 2026 (due 16 Sep 2026). No fixed version is recorded.
LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. Prior to 1.84.0, LiteLLM's MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint allowed an unauthenticated attacker to use a fabricated Authorization header to trigger an OAuth2 passthrough fallback path that replaced failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty UserAPIKeyAuth() object, allowing requests to reach MCP tooling without a valid LiteLLM key. This issue is fixed in version 1.84.0.
Briefing
Written from the sources below · claude-haiku-5-5
LiteLLM's MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint, prior to 1.84.0, let an unauthenticated attacker send a fabricated Authorization header to trigger an OAuth2 passthrough fallback. That fallback replaced failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty UserAPIKeyAuth() object, letting requests reach MCP tooling without a valid key. Affected: BerriAI LiteLLM before 1.84.0.
Why it mattersCISA lists this as known exploited in the KEV catalog, with a federal due date of 2026-09-16, and the flaw exposes MCP tooling to unauthenticated requests.
ActionUpgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to version 1.84.0 or later.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| BerriAI | LiteLLM | <1.84.0 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in LiteLLM, strongest first
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