rabbitmq-c: amqp_decode_bytes size_t integer overflow bypasses bounds check on 32-bit (OOB read)
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
rabbitmq-c is a C-language AMQP client library for RabbitMQ. Prior to version 0.17.0, the bounds check (*offset = o + len) <= encoded.len overflows when o + len > SIZE_MAX on 32-bit systems. len is a uint32_t read from the AMQP wire as a BYTES/UTF8 field length. The overflow wraps the check to a small value that passes, producing a decoded amqp_bytes_t with a multi-GB .len pointing into a small frame buffer. This results in an out-of-bounds read of up to ~4GB of process memory on 32-bit systems (ARM, MIPS, x86 ILP32, embedded IoT AMQP clients). Enabling information disclosure or denial of service. Not exploitable on 64-bit systems where size_t is 64-bit. This issue has been patched in version 0.17.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| alanxz | <0.17.0 |
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