kcp front-proxy does not strip inbound X-Remote-* identity headers, allowing any authenticated client to inject groups/warrants and impersonate system:masters in any workspace
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
kcp is a Kubernetes-like control plane for form-factors and use-cases beyond Kubernetes and container workloads. Prior to 0.31.4 and 0.32.2, the kcp front-proxy does not remove inbound X-Remote-User, X-Remote-Group, or X-Remote-Extra-* identity headers before forwarding requests to shards. Any authenticated tenant can inject X-Remote-Group: system:masters, authorization.kcp.io/warrant, authentication.kcp.io/scopes, or a group used for per-workspace required-group gating, and the shard trusts these values as authenticated identity assertions. This allows cross-workspace impersonation, authorization bypass, and arbitrary reading, writing, or deletion of resources, secrets, RBAC data, APIExports, APIBindings, and LogicalClusters. This issue is fixed in versions 0.31.4 and 0.32.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| kcp-dev | <0.31.4, >=0.32.0 <0.32.2 |
Timeline
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