SOCFortress CoPilot: Arbitrary Host File Write as Root via Path Traversal in the ScoutSuite GCP Report Upload (RCE)
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| socfortress | <0.1.77 |
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