netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser unchecked varint length overflow causes decoder crash
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java accumulates attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers into the int offset sumBytes. BinaryHttpParser.readRequestHead, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine, and BinaryHttpParser.getIndeterminateLength can narrow long lengths into that offset, causing integer wraparound before buffer indices are calculated. A remote peer that supplies a valid large encoded length to BinaryHttpParser or BinaryHttpDecoder can trigger an unchecked bounds exception from a small malformed message, fail or close the channel, and repeatedly cause denial of service. Java and Netty bounds checks prevent memory corruption, and no information disclosure was observed. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| netty | <0.0.23.Final |
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