libspdm: SPDM (DSP0274) FINISH transcript under-specifies the new 1.4 OpaqueData fields
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. In version 1.4.0, both the FINISH request (Table 80) and the FINISH_RSP response (Table 81) gained two new fields, OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, placed before the trailing signed/authenticated field. The transcript definitions used to compute and verify the FINISH signature, the FINISH HMAC (RequesterVerifyData), and the FINISH_RSP HMAC (ResponderVerifyData) were not updated and still terminate with a step of the form. Per DSP0274, the "SPDM Header Fields" are only the four header bytes (SPDMVersion, RequestResponseCode, Param1, Param2). A literal reading therefore excludes OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, even though those fields are transmitted before the trailing signature/HMAC field. Because the signature/HMAC must cover every field transmitted before it to "protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker," an active attacker could otherwise modify the opaque data in flight without invalidating the signature or HMAC. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| DMTF | =1.4.0 |
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