In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend exposes HTTP file-download endpoints (`GET /file`,…
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 1.74.0.
In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend exposes HTTP file-download endpoints (`GET /file`, `GET /files/`, `PUT /files/`) that convert a client-supplied URI directly to a filesystem path and stream the file, without confining it to the workspace or any allow-listed root. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in `@theia/core` re-issues the cookie and calls `next()` without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests, so these endpoints are reachable without a valid token. As a result an unauthenticated client can read any file readable by the backend process, including files outside the opened workspace (for example `/etc/hosts`, SSH keys, or tokens). Electron mode uses a separate `ElectronSecurityToken` and is not affected via this path.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | <1.74.0 | 1.74.0 |
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