AsyncSSH: asyncio event-loop freeze via SSH maximum packet size = 0 in SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN / OPEN_CONFIRMATION
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ronf | <2.24.0 |
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