netty-incubator-codec-ohttp BinaryHttpParser: Unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion DoS via infinite loop in field-section decoding
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java loops while fieldSectionLength is nonzero and relies on disabled-by-default assertions to require BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine to return a value and consume bytes. A corrupt field line can consume more bytes than its understated declared section length and drive the counter negative, or a truncated field line can return without consuming data and leave the parser in the same state. An unauthenticated OHTTP peer can encrypt such Binary HTTP content under the gateway public configuration, reach OHttpRequestResponseContext.ContentDecoder.decodeChunk, and permanently pin a Netty event-loop thread at full CPU before application business logic. Multiple requests can exhaust the event-loop group and deny service until restart. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| netty | <0.0.23.Final |
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