CVE-2026-64678

published 11 Nov 2026 · updated 12 Nov 2026

Nitrite: Unfiltered Java Deserialization in Legacy v1 Database Migration Path

9.8CriticalCVSS 9.8EPSS 1%

No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.

NOsql Object (NO2 a.k.a Nitrite) database is an open source nosql embedded document store. Prior to version 4.4.1, when Nitrite opens a database file, MVStoreUtils.openOrCreate() automatically checks for a legacy v1-format store and, on detecting one (or hitting a compatibility error while opening), triggers an automatic migration path. This path deserializes stored values using NitriteDataType.deserialize(byte[]), which passes the raw bytes directly to java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject() via a custom NitriteObjectInputStream subclass. That subclass overrides only readClassDescriptor() — solely to remap a handful of known legacy class names to their current equivalents — and implements no class allowlist, blocklist, or ObjectInputFilter (JEP 290). Any Serializable class reachable on the embedding application's classpath can therefore be instantiated via readObject(), with readObject()/readExternal()/readResolve() callbacks invoked unconditionally. If a suitable gadget class (e.g. from commons-collections or similar) happens to be present on the classpath, this is a precondition for remote code execution. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.1.

Affected

Vendors, products and packages with version ranges

VendorProductVersionsFixed
nitrite<4.4.1

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