ECDSA signature length is not validated in jose, allowing signature malleability
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 1.11.13 and 72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf.
The jose library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length. When verifying an ECDSA signature, jose_jwk_kty_ec:verify/4 in src/jwk/jose_jwk_kty_ec.erl splits the raw signature in half by its actual byte length (split_binary(Signature, byte_size(Signature) div 2)) instead of enforcing the fixed length required by RFC 7518 §3.4, and then decodes each half with crypto:bytes_to_integer/1, which ignores leading zero bytes. As a result, an attacker who holds one valid token can prepend leading zero bytes to each of the R and S halves to produce longer signatures that still split evenly and decode to the same (r, s) pair, so many distinct signature byte strings all verify against the same key (signature malleability). This does not allow forging new payloads or impersonating a signer, because the underlying (r, s) values are unchanged. It does defeat any security control that assumes a valid token or its signature is unique, such as token-revocation-by-hash, replay or idempotency caches, and deduplication logic. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | >=1.0.0 <1.11.13, >=a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429 <72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf | 1.11.13, 72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket