OpenEXR: Out-of-bounds read in HTJ2K decoder from unvalidated chunk header length (PLEN)
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, the HTJ2K decoder parses a header-length field (PLEN) from a chunk's compressed data but never checks that this value fits within the available buffer before using it. When decoding, it advances the codestream pointer by the attacker-supplied header size and passes the resulting offset and remaining length to the OpenJPH memory-input path, so a crafted value pushes the pointer past the end of the buffer and causes an out-of-bounds read. Because this field comes straight from attacker-controlled EXR chunk data, the flaw is reachable during normal decoding of an untrusted file. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.13.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| AcademySoftwareFoundation | >=3.4.0 <3.4.13 |
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