OpenEMR FaxSMS module: insecure staging of decrypted patient documents in webroot
A public exploit exists; no exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 8.2.0.
OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to 8.2.0, interface/modules/custom_modules/oe-module-faxsms/src/Controller/SignalWireClient.php decrypts a selected patient document with Document::get_data() and SignalWireClient::uploadFileForFax() writes the plaintext bytes under sites/{siteId}/fax. The module returns the resulting public URL to SignalWire, protects it only with a predictable uniqid() filename, and never removes the staged file. An unauthenticated network actor who obtains or guesses the URL can retrieve persistent patient documents even when drive encryption is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-emr | openemr | <8.2.0 | 8.2.0 |
| openemr | <8.2.0 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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