XML comment injection in Saxy encoder via unescaped double hyphen
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 1.7.0 and 6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41.
XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters. When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| qcam | >=0.7.0 <1.7.0, >=7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 <6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41 | 1.7.0, 6d12ee12b9e32e86ef598b3f3cafccd1840b2f41 |
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