RabbitMQ: AMQP 0-9-1 body assembly never validates accumulated size
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| rabbitmq | >=3.13.0 <3.13.15, >=4.0.0 <4.0.20, >=4.1.0 <4.1.11, >=4.2.0 <4.2.6 |
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