RabbitMQ: Atom-table exhaustion via reply-to queue name decoding
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| rabbitmq | >=4.2.0 <4.2.7, >=4.3.0 <4.3.1 |
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