better-auth SCIM 1.4.0-beta.27 before 1.6.22 Account Takeover via Provider-ID Collision
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 1.6.22 and 1.7.0-beta.10.
@better-auth/scim (a better-auth plugin) versions >= 1.4.0-beta.27 through <= 1.6.21 and >= 1.7.0-beta.0 through <= 1.7.0-beta.9 contain an authorization bypass. SCIM token issuance did not reject provider IDs already used by existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social account providers, and the same logical provider ID was used for both SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. An authenticated user could mint a SCIM token whose provider ID collided with an existing provider namespace, causing SCIM user routes to resolve account rows the token never provisioned. This allowed listing, reading, updating (including rewriting global profile/email fields without uniqueness checks), and deleting global user accounts and sessions, resulting in account takeover and unauthorized deprovisioning. Fixed in 1.6.22 and 1.7.0-beta.10 (1.7.0-rc.0).
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| better-auth | >=1.4.0-beta.27 <1.6.22, >=1.7.0-beta.0 <1.7.0-beta.10 | 1.6.22, 1.7.0-beta.10 |
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