ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Kernel f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc, Kernel 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1, Kernel 0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c and 12 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb, >=a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea <cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793, =2.6.34 | f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc, 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1, 0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c, 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02, 71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a, 9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295, a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb, cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793 |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=5.11.0 <5.15.216, >=5.16.0 <6.1.183, >=6.13.0 <6.18.42, >=6.19.0 <7.1.6, >=6.2.0 <6.6.148, >=6.7.0 <6.12.101, >=2.6.34 <5.10.265 | 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.18.42, 7.1.6, 6.6.148, 6.12.101, 5.10.265 |
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