eldap does not bound the port component of a referral URL before integer conversion
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in OTP *.
Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP eldap allows a malicious or compromised LDAP server to degrade availability by returning a referral URL whose port component is a very long run of digits. eldap:parse_port/2 passes the port substring straight to list_to_integer/1 with no length bound. The surrounding try ... catch only rejects a value that fails to parse, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the caller hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per referral. The conversion function itself is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. Reaching the flaw requires the application to pass a server-supplied referral to eldap:parse_ldap_url/1, which eldap never calls itself: referral strings are returned to the caller unparsed. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to eldap from 1.0.3 before 1.2.14.2, 1.2.16.1, and 1.3.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang | OTP | =1.0.3, =17.0, =d8dbf15de4fa1a08b9a05e7d8e08fdb025fe1dc3 | * |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Erlang, strongest first
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