pay-rails/pay: non-constant-time HMAC comparison in Paddle Billing webhook signature verifier
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
Pay is a payments engine for Ruby on Rails 6.0 and higher. Prior to 11.6.2, Pay::Webhooks::PaddleBillingController#valid_signature? in app/controllers/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing_controller.rb compares the computed 64-character SHA-256 HMAC with the attacker-controlled h1 token from the Paddle-Signature header using Ruby String#==. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can repeatedly submit requests to /pay/webhooks/paddle_billing and obtain sufficiently precise timing measurements can infer matching digest prefixes and recover a valid signature. A forged accepted webhook is enqueued through Pay::Webhooks::ProcessJob and can cause a host application to update billing state, provision paid features, record refunds, or trigger customer notifications. This issue is fixed in version 11.6.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| pay-rails | <11.6.2 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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