wicked: integer underflow of the UDP length in ni_capture_inspect_udp_header() leads to an out-of-bounds read
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
An integer underflow was found in the DHCPv4 packet capture code of wicked. ni_capture_inspect_udp_header() in src/capture.c does not verify that the IP total length field (ip_len) is at least as large as the IP header length (ihl) before subtracting the header length. An unauthenticated attacker on the same network can thereby trigger an out-of-bounds read past the receive buffer in the wicked DHCPv4 client (wickedd-dhcp4), which can crash the daemon depending on the process memory layout. No information disclosure has been demonstrated. This issue affects wicked up to and including version 0.6.80.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| SUSE | <=0.6.80 |
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