Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in chainguard.dev/sdk 0.1.107.
The Chainguard SDK is a public Go SDK for integrating with the Chainguard platform. Prior to 0.1.107, auth/aws.VerifyToken trusts the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers without requiring those headers to be covered by AWS SigV4 SignedHeaders. An attacker with a fresh STS GetCallerIdentity request signed by a victim can rewrite the unsigned binding headers and replay the proof to another relying party, causing the relying party to authenticate the victim’s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. Code that only uses auth/aws.GenerateToken is unaffected because the generator signs the binding headers, and exploitation requires a signed request within its validity window. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.107.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| chainguard-dev | <0.1.107 | ||
| go: chainguard.dev/sdk | <0.1.107, <=0.1.106 | 0.1.107 |
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