ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Kernel 247d055504dcc852e539b9f7f30d19f9741474bf, Kernel 290e9e8389b556efc603522e28bd1543846aa336, Kernel 2f75c0faa3361b28e36cc0512b3299e163e25789 and 5 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup set_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the IPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped extension headers and found the real transport header. This makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP packets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an 8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by sctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the SCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves from NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established timeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters incorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not completed. Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for the SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without extension headers this preserves the existing offset.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =2.6.34, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <247d055504dcc852e539b9f7f30d19f9741474bf, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <290e9e8389b556efc603522e28bd1543846aa336, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <2f75c0faa3361b28e36cc0512b3299e163e25789, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <9cb5ac594ca76d3a71803b23b74c835b0721e628, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <9f94573ab962a9e81954b755da016fa3cd2f5039, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <a4a2d2e483d79cc2ad3a170674cf159644acf22b, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <d2b8b1557ec07ea1bb5dddbceaf4dfe63d388e27, >=2906f66a5682e5670a5eefe991843689b8d8563f <e5d0bb8871668f20de8f3c94b5ae3f372346bc6e | 247d055504dcc852e539b9f7f30d19f9741474bf, 290e9e8389b556efc603522e28bd1543846aa336, 2f75c0faa3361b28e36cc0512b3299e163e25789, 9cb5ac594ca76d3a71803b23b74c835b0721e628, 9f94573ab962a9e81954b755da016fa3cd2f5039, a4a2d2e483d79cc2ad3a170674cf159644acf22b, d2b8b1557ec07ea1bb5dddbceaf4dfe63d388e27, e5d0bb8871668f20de8f3c94b5ae3f372346bc6e |
Timeline
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