CVE-2026-72222

published 15 Aug 2026 · updated 17 Nov 2026

sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback

9.8CriticalCVSS 9.8EPSS 1%

No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Kernel f3b55945dd99f29d83e1965d0141040a35262346, Kernel 083e9c2ec7e8bb13b79c9fd7b337abdd758ecc5f, Kernel 2d4f97d13fff91e0bc539216be88b884b544d49f and 6 more.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done. The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry. Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all(). [cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change]

Affected

Vendors, products and packages with version ranges

VendorProductVersionsFixed
LinuxKernel>=b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 <f3b55945dd99f29d83e1965d0141040a35262346, >=b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 <083e9c2ec7e8bb13b79c9fd7b337abdd758ecc5f, >=b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 <2d4f97d13fff91e0bc539216be88b884b544d49f, >=b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 <3f9ee75a97a769be258784c22b89657acb5ed9bd, >=b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 <4f988f3a2808fb659f3880c282041ff067acad78, =6.4f3b55945dd99f29d83e1965d0141040a35262346, 083e9c2ec7e8bb13b79c9fd7b337abdd758ecc5f, 2d4f97d13fff91e0bc539216be88b884b544d49f, 3f9ee75a97a769be258784c22b89657acb5ed9bd, 4f988f3a2808fb659f3880c282041ff067acad78
linux-kernel: Kernel>=6.19.0 <7.1.5, >=6.4.0 <6.6.145, >=6.7.0 <6.12.97, >=6.13.0 <6.18.407.1.5, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40

Timeline

Every event on this vulnerability

Related

Other vulnerabilities in Kernel, strongest first

Embed

A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket

CVE-2026-72222 severity on Zeptric[![CVE-2026-72222](https://zeptric.io/badge/cve/CVE-2026-72222.svg)](https://zeptric.io/cve/CVE-2026-72222)