Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 0.12.0 and ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty. MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas <= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZenHive | machine_payments_protocol | >=0.2.0 <0.12.0 | 0.12.0 |
| ZenHive | >=0.2.0 <0.12.0, >=d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7 <ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076 | 0.12.0, ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket