Envoy: Cross-user response poisoning via a generic (non-WebSocket) HTTP upgrade on Envoy's shared backend pool
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy forwards data for a configured non-WebSocket HTTP upgrade before the upstream accepts the upgrade. An unauthenticated HTTP/2 client can place a complete HTTP/1.1 request in extended CONNECT data; Envoy downgrades the request, writes the data unframed to a keep-alive HTTP/1.1 upstream, and returns the socket to the shared pool while the smuggled response remains queued. A different downstream client can then receive the attacker's response. The relevant scope boundary is that webSocket upgrades, plain CONNECT, disabled backend keep-alive, per-downstream pools, and max_requests_per_connection set to 1 are not affected by the demonstrated path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| envoyproxy | <1.36.10, >=1.37.0 <1.37.6, >=1.38.0 <1.38.4, >=1.39.0 <1.39.1 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Vendor advisories
Timeline
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