ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel ee41b00858ca65b4428e99efe39a4277c1f043d2, Kernel 127033b79383a3e78361d7e971588aa8849f5124, Kernel 205feb72e5beb3140e4e1403b6cff30cf739bab9 and 8 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev() ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses ->state and ->ublksrv_pid. A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the "->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an unrelated task as the ublk server. Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing. ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than ->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <ee41b00858ca65b4428e99efe39a4277c1f043d2, >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <127033b79383a3e78361d7e971588aa8849f5124, >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <205feb72e5beb3140e4e1403b6cff30cf739bab9, >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <787c944502e7e63d20a9201bada77e0dd924f458, >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <b67ce16b26ad0f14cfd6071013840aa95f823bea, >=6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682 <e65848e4ce352bac9e3465099354c8b8f845391f, =6.0 | ee41b00858ca65b4428e99efe39a4277c1f043d2, 127033b79383a3e78361d7e971588aa8849f5124, 205feb72e5beb3140e4e1403b6cff30cf739bab9, 787c944502e7e63d20a9201bada77e0dd924f458, b67ce16b26ad0f14cfd6071013840aa95f823bea, e65848e4ce352bac9e3465099354c8b8f845391f |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=6.13.0 <6.18.44, >=6.19.0 <7.1.8, >=6.2.0 <6.6.151, >=6.7.0 <6.12.103, >=6.0.0 <6.1.183 | 6.18.44, 7.1.8, 6.6.151, 6.12.103, 6.1.183 |
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