OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verifying its signature
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in @openeudi/openid4vp 0.8.1.
OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior to 0.8.1, src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts ChainBuilder.tryBuild() terminates chain construction when an attacker-controlled certificate Subject Distinguished Name equals a trusted anchor subject, without verifying cryptographic closure to the anchor public key. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a self-signed leaf or intermediate that reuses the trusted Subject Distinguished Name and have credentials signed by the attacker key accepted as issued by the trusted authority. The public src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts TrustEvaluator.evaluate() path compounds the error by matching a terminus through serialNumber and falling back to anchors[0], which can attribute the forged chain to genuine trusted-authority metadata. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| openeudi | <0.8.1 | ||
| npm: @openeudi/openid4vp | <0.8.1, <=0.8.0 | 0.8.1 |
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