Punk::OAuth2 versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an attacker-chosen off-site redirect after login because same_origin_path accepts a backslash or tab in the return parameter
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 0.03.
Punk::OAuth2 versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an attacker-chosen off-site redirect after login because same_origin_path accepts a backslash or tab in the return parameter. oauth2_login reads the return parameter from the initiation request, runs same_origin_path over it, and stores the survivor in the session flow record as the post-login redirect target. That check rejects a value that does not begin with a slash, one with a slash as its second byte, and one containing CR or LF. A backslash and a tab pass. The URL Standard treats a backslash as equivalent to a slash for special schemes, so `/\evil.example` parses with the authority `evil.example`. It also strips ASCII tab before parsing, so a tab between two leading slashes leaves `//evil.example`. A crafted link to the application's own login route lands the victim on the attacker's site after a genuine authentication. The redirect carries no authorization code or access token.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| <0.03 | 0.03 |
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