AshAdmin cookie reader matches names by substring, enabling actor/session shadowing from a sibling subdomain
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 1.3.1 and e93a3408a85035e1f90275d02bc2470c96095e56.
Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode. AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=0.9.1 <1.3.1, >=77a43cc4fa04cb59c38fc434568a35a38ecb995a <e93a3408a85035e1f90275d02bc2470c96095e56 | 1.3.1, e93a3408a85035e1f90275d02bc2470c96095e56 |
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