Arbitrary Code Execution via Unsafe Deserialization in LabOne Q
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 26.1.2.
The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q's deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zurich Instruments | >=2.41.0 <26.1.2, >=26.4.0b1 <=26.4.0b5 | 26.1.2 |
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