OAuth2 Proxy 7.15.2 through 7.15.4 Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Under the Default Trusted Proxy Set
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
OAuth2 Proxy honours a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when deciding whether a request may skip authentication, because the guard added for CVE-2026-40575 is inert in the default reverse-proxy configuration. GetRequestURI in pkg/requests/util/util.go prefers that header over the real request URI whenever CanTrustForwardedHeaders returns true, and isAllowedPath in oauthproxy.go matches the skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex allow list against the resulting path. CanTrustForwardedHeaders in pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go grants that trust when the caller's address is in the trusted proxy set, and buildTrustedProxyNetSet falls back to defaultTrustedProxyIPs, which is 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0, whenever reverse proxy mode is enabled without trusted_proxy_ip configured. Every client is therefore treated as a trusted proxy. An unauthenticated attacker can request a protected upstream path while setting X-Forwarded-Uri to a value matching an allow-listed route, so the skip-auth decision is made against the spoofed value while the upstream receives the protected path unchanged.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| oauth2-proxy | >=7.15.2 <=7.15.4 |
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