Omnivore Stored Server-Side Request Forgery via the setWebhook Mutation
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a.
The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| omnivore-app | <c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a | c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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