MyMangaDB: Unauthenticated path traversal in cover-image upload allows arbitrary file write, escalating to the same database-overwrite takeover
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
MyMangaDB is a self-hosted manga collection manager with automatic metadata, MyAnimeList import, Docker support, and collection statistics. Prior to 2.7.2, the unauthenticated /api/v1/images/manga/save handler in backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/image.py accepts a client-controlled filename and joins it to IMAGE_SAVE_PATH without confining the result. Traversal sequences can escape the image directory and overwrite process-writable files, including DATABASE_PATH for the live SQLite database, while the client-supplied image content type does not validate the uploaded bytes. An attacker can replace the database to plant an administrative user and can overwrite other writable files, causing full application compromise and availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 2.7.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| FabianRolfMatthiasNoll | <2.7.2 |
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