Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard validates the resolved IP but connects by hostname, allowing DNS-rebinding TOCTOU
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in flyto-core 2.26.8.
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf in src/core/utils.py resolves and checks a hostname but returns the hostname URL rather than the validated address, and session.get in http.get performs an independent DNS lookup when connecting. A low-privileged caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make the first lookup return a public address and the connection-time lookup return an internal address, bypassing the SSRF guard for all modules that call it and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. Successful exploitation requires attacker-controlled DNS and a successful timing-dependent answer change between the two lookups. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| flytohub | <2.26.8 | ||
| pypi: flyto-core | <2.26.8, <=2.26.7 | 2.26.8 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in flyto-core (PyPI), strongest first
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