Tapo: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated Tapo MCP smart-home controls
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| mihai-dinculescu | >=0.3.1 <0.5.0 |
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