Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in jupyter-mcp-server 1.0.3.
Jupyter MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol server for Jupyter. Prior to 1.0.3, standalone streamable-http mode validates Host and Origin values for /mcp but does not apply the same browser-origin controls to the state-changing /api/connect and /api/stop management routes. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding so that its hostname resolves to a loopback, LAN, VPN, or published-container MCP listener, then send a browser-shaped request that /api/connect accepts to replace runtime_url and document_url values and start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure. The attacker can thereby cause Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to reach that infrastructure and can use /api/stop to stop the current notebook kernel. The default broad bind can increase exposure, but the vulnerability is the missing management-route origin boundary, not a lack of Host validation on /mcp. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| datalayer | <1.0.3 | ||
| pypi: jupyter-mcp-server | <1.0.3, <=1.0.2 | 1.0.3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in jupyter-mcp-server (PyPI), strongest first
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