Remark42: Rate limit bypass via unconditional trust of X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers in direct-internet deployment
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in github.com/umputun/remark42/backend 1.16.2.
Remark42 is a self-hosted comment engine for blogs, articles, or any other place where readers can add comments. From 1.0.0 until 1.16.2, Remark42 globally trusts True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-For without verifying that the direct peer is a trusted proxy, and middleware.RealIP overwrites r.RemoteAddr before per-IP controls run. In a directly reachable deployment, or a proxy that forwards attacker-controlled headers, a remote attacker can rotate spoofed forwarding headers to obtain fresh token buckets for rate-limited endpoints, bypass vote de-duplication when --votes-ip is enabled, mint anonymous identities, and poison stored comment IPs and request logs. The global concurrent-request throttle and per-request timeouts still limit availability impact. Mitigation support is available in version 1.16.2, but operators must configure --trusted-proxy for the deployment topology.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| umputun | >=1.0.0 <1.16.2 | ||
| go: github.com/umputun/remark42 | >=1.0.0 <=1.2.0 | ||
| go: github.com/umputun/remark42/backend | >=1.0.0 <1.16.2 | 1.16.2 |
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