Timing Side-Channel in SM2 Signature Generation
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1zj, OpenSSL 3.0.23, OpenSSL 3.4.8 and 3 more.
Issue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic on secret values, forming a timing side-channel. Impact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key. CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy Description: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using variable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so the time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values, forming a timing side-channel. Applications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all platforms. FIPS Impact: no SM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL | OpenSSL | >=1.1.1 <1.1.1zj, >=3.0.0 <3.0.23, >=3.4.0 <3.4.8, >=3.5.0 <3.5.9, >=3.6.0 <3.6.5, >=4.0.0 <4.0.3 | 1.1.1zj, 3.0.23, 3.4.8, 3.5.9, 3.6.5, 4.0.3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
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